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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERN H. PETERSEN and 
GEORGIA PETERSE~, husband and 
wife; REED L. PETERSEN and 
ETHEL L. PETERSEN 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
JULE COMBE, JR., and 
JULE COMBE, SR., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The Plaintiffs brought this action to restrain the De-
fendants from interfering with the use of a road known as 
4600 South Street in Weber County, Utah. The Plaintiffs 
further sought a restraining order requiring the Defendants 
to remove signs posted on said road which indicated that it 
was a private road, with a further statement that the road 
came to a "dead end" and that no trespassing thereon would 
be allowed. The defendants counterclaimed, alleging that 
the road was a private road and could restrict the use thereof 
by other landowners 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Weber County, by the Hon. 
Charles G. Cowley, Judge, adjudicated that the road in ques-
tion was a public road, and restrained the Defendants from 
interfering with the use thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs and respondents seek to have the lower 
Court Judgment rendered herein, affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Regarding the statement of facts as elicited in appellants' 
brief, respondents deny Lhat the original road did not connect 
with Harrison Boulevard, as stated on Page 2, and further, 
that the signs mentioned on Page 3 were in existence, as 
indicated. Further, the prep01:derance of the evidence indi-
cated that the public had used the road, without objection 
from the Defendants, and further, that the County had de-
finitely maintained the road. The facts in support of re-
spondents' contentions are as follows: 
In 1965, the Plaintiffs had a subdivision dedicated and 
approved in Ogden City, known as "The Knollwood Estates" 
subdivision (TR 91, lines 7-12). This subdivision was planned 
for approximately seventy building lots for residential con-
struction. At the time of the trial hearing five homes had 
been constructed in said subdivision and were all occupied 
(TR 91, lines 29-30). The subject road is the only road that 
gives any access to Plaintiffs' subdivision. (TR 93, line 4). 
The subject road is further the only road that led to the Far-
rell home, Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest for more than 
25 years. (TR 93, line 6). 
There are other homes that use 4600 South Street as 
access to their property. Bertha Martinet (TR 41, line 12) 
testified that she had lived in her home for 50 years or more, 
that the road has been in existence for 50 years or more, 
and that this is the only access road to her property (TR 41, 
lines 14-19). She further testified that "a lot of people go 
2 
over it" (TR 41, line 2 2) and that no one has ever been 
stopped from using the road (TR 41, line 24). Defendant 
Jule Combe, Sr. further testified that he offered to give the 
road to the County in 1945 if they would grade and maintain 
it (TR 140, line 30), (TR 141, lines 1-9). Defendant Jule 
Combe, Sr. further testified that Weber County equipment 
was used to construct the road (TR 141, line 11), as follows: 
"Did they use a County grader to put it in?" Answer: "Yes." 
Defendant Combe, Sr. further stated, by his own admission, 
that l\1r. Farrell, Plaintiffs' prior owner, had used the road 
since 1945 (TR 143, line 2). Defendant Jule Combe, Sr. 
further admitted that the County had scrapers on the road 
every year since 1945 to plow the snow and maintain same 
!TR 143, lines 25-30) and (TR 144, lines 2-7), and at his 
request, (TR 144, line 16) "You wanted the County to main-
tain this road, didn't you?" Answer, "Yes." Defendant 
Jule Combe, Sr. further testified that for the last 10 years he 
ha<l not stopped anyone from using the road (TR 145, line 17), 
however he did testify that more than 10 years ago he at-
tempted to stop "lovers'' from driving over the road but they 
didn't pay any attention to him (TR 145, line 11). 
Plaintiffs' witness, David Wadsworth, an employee of 
Ogden City, testified that Ogden City has a reservoir east of 
the Plaintiffs' property and that he has used the road every 
day to maintain the reservoir and has never been stopped 
from using same. He further stated that this is the only road 
that gives Ogden City access to said reservoir (TR 9, line 14 
and line 30). Plaintiffs' witness Florence J. Harris, testified 
that Jim Farrell had used the road for more than 33 years 
and that she personally had travelled over the road for the 
la~t 33 years (TR 16, lines 29-30). Her frequency of use 
3 
apparently was two to three times a month (TR 1 7, line 17 1. 
Anna l\lartinet, another owner of a home on 4600 South 
Street, testified that she has lived in her residence, off and ! 
on, about 50 years (TR 20, line 1 7). She also testified that 
the road had been in use by other people for the last SO 
years (TR 20, line 21). Her testimony further stated that 
there had not been any gates across the road for the last 50 
years (TR 21, line 4). Her testimony further indicated that 
the public had never been stopped from using the road in 
the last 50 years (TR 2 2, lines 1-3), and verified the county 
maintenance of the road (TR 23, line 20). On cross-examina-
tion, Anna l\lartinet further testified that the road had be-
come heavily travelled in the last 8 or 10 years (TR 2 7, line 
30 (TR 28, line 1). 
Kathy Preece testified that she owns a home in the 
Knollwood Estates Subdivision (TR 34, line 16). Her testi-
mony further indicated that she had never been restricted 
in the use of the road (TR 3 5, lines 7-9). Action was also 
taken by the Weber County Commission wherein a resolution 
was unanimously passed declaring that the road in question 
was a public road because of the usage by the public in exces' 
of 10 years. This resolution is stated in Plaintiffs' Exhiit "C". 
Plaintiffs' sixth witness was a Mr. Charles Hansaker. He 
stated that he moved into the Farrell home, on Plaintiffs' 
property, in 1941(TR47, lines 18-19). He further indicated 
that 4600 South Street was the only road to the Farrell home 
that he was renting (TR 47, lines 23-29). He lived in the 
Farrell home from 1941 until the fall of 1952 (TR 48, line' 
18-20). He then moved back in the Farrell home in 1952 
and lived there until 1956 (TR 48, lines 20-25). Altogether 
he lived in the Farrell home 2 2 years (TR 49, line 3 ) . He 
further stated that during these 2 2 years the public had never 
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been restricted from using the road (TR 49, lines 11-16). 
Regarding the "no trespassing" sign, his testimony indicates 
that it was first put up three or four years ago (TR SO, lines 
22-24 ). ?\Ir. Hansaker further stated that the Weber Basin 
Water District had used this road since 1956 or 1957 (TR 56, 
lines 16-18), with the Forest Service, and the South Ogden 
Water Company (TR 56, line 30). He further indicated that 
County plowed, scraped, and maintained the road once every 
two months (TR 5, lines 20-29). He further stated that he, 
himself, had called the County a dozen times to "plow the 
snow", starting in 1941 (TR 59, lines 22-24). 
Plaintiffs' seventh witness was Mr. A. E. Benning. His 
testimony stated that his home also was on 4600 South Street, 
east of the Combe property (TR 61, lines 7-28). Further, he 
:itated that this is the only road to his property (TR 62, 
lines 8-10)). He bought his property in 1954 (TR 62, line 
12 ). Mr. Benning further indicated that he did not know of 
the public being restricted in the use of the road since 19 54 
1 TR 1 7, line 2 2). Tl~e next Plaintiffs' witness was Mr. Elmer 
L. Burton. He testified that he owned real estate soutth of 
A. E. Benning's property (TR 76, lines 1-2). He further 
stated that the public had the full use of the road for the last 
25 years (TR 76, line 20). His testimony further indicated 
that this was the road that gave him access to his property 
(TR 7 6, lines 2 6-30). He furtiler indicated that the Burch 
Creek Water Company used this road (TR 77, line 16). He 
further indicated that the first time he saw a "no trespassing" 
sign was two or three years ago (TR 80, line 10). 
Plaintiffs' next witness was Jim Kostoff, an employee 
of the Weber Basin \Yater Conservancy District. He testified 
that the Weber Basin \Vater District constructed reservoirs 
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m an area south of the Plaintiffs' property. He further de-
scribed "Exhiit R", showing the location of the reservoirs 
and air valves, etc., which must be maintained by said district 
(TR 112, lines 27-30) and (TR 113, lines 1-11). He further 
testified that these facilities required inspection at least two 
or three times a week during the summer (TR 113, lines 
14-15). Mr Kostoff further indicated that 4600 South Street 
was the only road available to get access to the Weber Basin 
facilities (TR 113, lines 24-26). He further testified that 
he first used the road in 1956 (TR 115, line 56) and that 
he had never been restricted from said usage (TR 115, line 
18), and that he had travelled it himself 30 to 40 times (TR 
115, lines 28-29). An employee of the Mountain States Tele-
phone Company, James L. Patterson, testified that his com-
pany had a reflector located on the foothills, which was con-
structed in 1962. He further indicated that it was necessary 
to travel 4600 South Street to get to their facilities, which 
were inspected at least once a year (TR 120, lines 11-13), 
(TR 120, line 30), (TR 121, line 1). 
The next witness was a Udell Gardner, an employee of 
the Utah Fish and Game Department. He indicated that the 
Fish and Game Department owned Section 19, which lies just 
south and a little east of the Knollwood Estates Subdivision 
(TR 123, lines 20-21). He further indicated that to his own 
knowledge the Fish and Game Department had travelled 4600 
South Street to get to their property since 1960 and probably 
before that (TR 12 3, lines 2 4, 2 5, 2 6). He further indicated 
that the Fish and Game Department had never been restricted 
in their use of this road (TR 15, line 17). Plaintiff Vern H. 
Petersen, testified that there are 71 lots altogether in the 
Knollwood Etates Subdivision, and that the value of the 
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homes that have been constructed have been approximately 
~30,000 !TR 127, lines 14-17). Plaintiffs' exhibit "A" to "R" 
iurther show the extent of the use of the road, the opinion of 
the \V eber County Surveyor's office, and that this roadway 
was described in prior deeds, beginning in 1907. Jule Combe, 
Jr .. the most militant Defendant, just purchased his property 
in 1961, and moved into his home in 1962 (TR 156, lines 
17-20) and only owns approximately 300 feet, of the total 
length of approximately 5,000 feet of the road. 
ARGUMENT 
Vtah Statute 27-12-89, enacted in 1963, which is iden-
tical to the former Statute of 27-1-2, which was originally 
enacted in 1898, provides as follows: 
PUBLIC CONSTITUTING DEDICATION. A high-
way shall br deemed to have been dedicated and aban-
doned to the use of the public when it has been continu-
ously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten 
year. 
Of the 16 witnesses, the only witness that claimed that 
there had not been unrestricted use of the road for 10 years 
or more was Jule Combe, Jr. 
Anna Martinet, and Bertha l\.Iartinet, who have used 4600 
South Street as access to their residence, testified that it had 
been used by them for at least 50 years. Mr. Hansaker, who 
rented the home on the Plaintiffs' property, and used 4600 
South Street as the only access to his home, testified that he 
hact used the road without restriction for a total of 2 2 years 
~inre 1941. If the Defendants were allowed the close the 
roa<l, or restrict the use, then any of the other 40 to 50 land-
owners who have their homes on 4600 South Street, or use 
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this road, would also have the same right, which could deny 
access to all owners. Approximately two-thirds of the road 
has been paved by Weber County, and the other part was 
constructed by Weber County, and totally maintained by the 
County since its existence. The Defendants themselves con· 
sider this the County's obligation. Further, Jule Combe, Sr. 
stated that he offered the road to the County in 1945, if they 
would maintain same. 
The evidence is conclusive by all witnesses that the 
County has maintained the road since this offer was made. 
It is undisputed that the James Farrell home, Plaintiffs' prior 
owner, used 4600 South Street as access thereto since 1945, 
even as admitted by Defendant Jule Combe, Sr. The usage 
of the road, in providing access to residential property, has 
not been changed to all by the Plaintiffs. It seems ironic, 
that Defendant Jule Combe, Jr., who has only used the road 
since 1961, now claims that he has the right to restrict the 
use thereof, when less than 7 % of the entire road is located 
on his land, and there have ben other rights of usage thereto, ' 
by the other owners for more than SO years. 
If the other property owners demanded the same rights 
that he claims, then he would not have access to his property. 
It now appears that with the Forest Green Estates Sub-
division, and Knollwood Estate Subdivision, there will be in 
access of 200 homes that will use this road as an access to 
their property. Further, the resolution passed by the Weber 
County Commission, states as follows: 
"NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby resolved and ordered 
that the area of 4600 South Street, located in the unin-
corporated area of Weber County, Utah, as now platted 
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in the records of the Weber County Recorder, be and the 
same is hereby declared to be a county road, for the 
benefit and use of the public, and that said area of road 
shall continue to be maintained by Weber County. 
Stated Jiarch 16, 1965. 
Board of County Commissioners of Weber County. 
State of Utah, by Bud Favero, Chairman. 
A recent Utah decision is Bonner v Sudbury, cited in 
417 P2d 646. This case concerned the public use of a dead-
end alley in Salt Lake City. Our Court held that where this 
alley had been platted as a public street, paved and maintained 
through the use of public funds, and where witnesses testified 
that it had been used for more than 2 S years by the public, 
that these facts would constitute a dedication under 27-12-89 
UCA 53. The court further stated that the resolution of this 
issue cannot rest entirely upon what the owner says was his 
intent. 
In Clark v Erikson cited in 341 Pd 424 our Supreme 
Court further held that where there was testimony that the 
road had been used considerably in excess of 10 years, as a 
short-cut to a fishing stream and by people going to church, 
and with further reference being made to the road in the 
deeds and abstracts, that this usage constituted a public dedi-
cation under this statute. 
Another recent case 1s Joseph Boyer v Clifford Clark 
cited in 326 P2d 107, where a road in Summit County crossed 
approximately 1500 feet of the Defendant's property. The 
testimony in that case established that the road had been 
used for over SO years for hauling coal, crossing the open 
range, driving cattle, sheep, etc. The landowner objecting to 
public use had acquired his property approximately 12 years 
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prior to the filing of the court action when he installed signs 
thereafter and attempted to restrict its use. The Supreme 
Court in reversing the trial court, held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to establish public use under 27-12-89, even ' 
though this road had never been maintained at public expense 
The court, in discussing the evidence and applicable law, 
stated as follows: 
"The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case dis-
closed that for a period exceeding 50 years, the public, 
even though not consisting of a great many persons, 
made a continuous and uninterrupted use of Middle Can-
yon Road in traveling by wagon and other vehicles and 
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by horse from Upton to Grass Creek and other points ' 
as often as they found it convenient or necessary. They 
trailed cattle, and sheep, hauled coal, and used this trail 
for other purposes in traveling Grass Creek and various 
other points to and from Highway 133. This evidence 
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was sufficient as a matter of law to establish a highway 
by dedication and the court erred in finding otherwise. 
The highway once having been established by such use, 
it is provided by statute, Sec. 27-1-3, U.C.A. 1953• t'itat 
it"*** must continue to be highway(s) until abandoned 
by order of the board of county commissioner * * * or 
other competent authority." There is no contention that 
any such procedure has been invoked here." 
Another Utah statute, 27-12-92, also enacted in 1963 ' 
which was an exact re-statement of 27-1-10, originally enacted 
m 1898, states as follows: 
"PATENTEE AND COUNTY TO ASSERT CLAIMS 
TO ROADS CROSS!l'v'G LAND - Whenever any per-
son shall acquire title from the United States to any land 
in this state over which there shall at the time extend 
any public highway that shall not theretofore have been 
dul
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y platted, and that shall not have been continuously 
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used as used for a period of ten years theretofore, he shall 
within three months after receipt of his patent assert his 
claim for damages in writing to the board of county com-
sioners of the county in which the land is situated; and 
said board shall have an additional period of three months 
in whirh to begin proceedings to condemn the land ac-
rording to law. Such highway shall continue open as a 
public highway during said periods; but in case no action 
is begun by the board of county commissioners within 
the period above stated, such highway shall be deemed 
to be abandoned by the pubbic. In case of a failure by 
such person so acquiring title to public lands to assert his 
claim for damage as aforesaid for three months from the 
time he shall have received a patent to such lands, he 
shall thereafter be barred from asserting or recovering 
any damages by reason of such public highway, and 
the same shall remain open." 
It is apparent from the wording of this statute that if a 
patentee desire to contest the existence of any public highway 
upon his property when the patent is issued, even though the 
road shall not have been used for 10 years prior thereto, he 
shall have 3 months after receipt of his patent to assert a 
claim against the county commissioners for damages, and to 
further require the condemnation of said road. If this action 
is not asserted within said period, then he is forever barred 
from asserting or recovering any damages, by reason of such 
public highway and the same shall remain open. 
It is clear from this statute and the evidence admitted at 
the trial that Michael Combe, Defendants' predecessor in in-
terest, had to assert his claim within 3 months after receiving 
his patent or he would be forever barred from disputing the 
public use thereof. 
The testimony of witnesses indicated tthat this road was 
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in existence and used by George Farrell, as the entrance to 
his home, as he homesteaded Section 15 and received the . 
patent thereto, as did Michael Combe to Section 10. 
I 
Another applicable federal statute is 43 USCA 93 2, which \ 
states as follows: i 
"RIGHT-OF-WAY FOR HIGHWAYS. The right-of- i 
way for the construction of highways, not reserved for : 
the public uses, is hereby granted." 1 
A case construing this statute is Van Wanning v Deter, 
cited in 112 NW 902. 
"A settler on public lands on which there is a road in 
comrmon use as a public highway takes subject to the 
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public easement of such, as a road though it was never I 
established by the public authorities under the general 
road laws." I 
Another Utah case is Morris v Blunt cited in 161 P 1127, I 
where the Court held as follows: 
"Under this section, the highway, even though it be over 
privately owned ground, will be deemed dedicated or 
abandoned to the public use when the public has con- . 
tinuously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of ten I 
years, but such use must be by the public." 1 
Another recent Utah case is Gillmor v Carter cited in 
391 P2d 426, where the Court held as follows: 
"In order for a private road to become a public thorough-
fare there must be evidence of intent by the owner to 1 
vacate the road to a public use and an acceptance by the 
public. Such intent may be inferred from the decorations, 
acts or circumstances and uses by the general public." 
Regarding the resolution passed by the Weber County 
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Commission in March of 1965, this authority would seem to 
be inferred from Utah Statute 17-5-42, which states as fol-
lows: 
"REGV LA TIO NS OF USE OF ROADS. They may 
enact ordinances and make regulations not in conflict of 
law for tlte control, construction, alteration, repair and 
use of all roads and highways in the county outside of 
incorporated cities." 
It further appears from the statement issued by the 
Weber County Surveyor's office that there has been continual 
use of 4600 South Street for more than ten years, and further 
shows their opinion regarding public dedication. 
CONCLUSION 
Most of the cases cited by appellants in their brief in 
the lower Court, were decisions that were rendered before the 
advent of the automobile. The photographs, that were ad-
mitted in evidence, also show the extensive usage of this road. 
Further, the testimony of the tenant of the Farrell home, 
showing his occupancy since 1940 and the use of the road to 
get to his home, which is undisputed, shows a minimum of 27 
years of unrestricted use. Where it is the intention of the 
Plaintiffs to just use the road for access to residential prop-
erty, as it has been so used in excess of 2 7 years, then there 
is no change of usage thereof. It is respectfully submitted 
that the lower Court judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEITH E. MURRAY 
13 
